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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates the relationship between cor-
ruption, political instability and economic growth. We first show how
these variables interact by allowing for bidirectional causality between
each two of the three variables for which we employ a panel VAR
model on a dataset of 140 countries over the period of 1990-2017. Then,
we exploit the incidence of the Arab Spring, as an exogenous shock,
to measure the short-term effects of political shocks on corruption
levels, political stability and economic growth using the differences-
in-differences (DiD) framework.
Keywords: Corruption, Political Stability, Democratization, Arab Spring,
Economic Growth, MENA Region, Panel VAR, Differences-in-Differences
JEL code: D72; D73; E02; O43; F43; O47
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1 Introduction
Although there is ample evidence of its impacts, the economic effects of
corruption, especially on growth, continue to be a debatable topic in the
literature. In this regard, the literature has suggested two different hy-
potheses: sanding the wheels vs. greasing the wheels. While the former
confirms such intuitive negative growth impacts, the latter suggests that
corruption can have some positive impacts on the economy by circumvent-
ing cumbersome bureaucratic regulations. There are many channels that
can explain the effects of corruption on growth such as investment and
government expenditures. For example, empirical evidence reported by
Mauro (1998), Davoodi and Tanzi (2002) and Gupta et al. (2002) shows
that corruption distorts government expenditures towards less productive
activities. Cooray et al. (2017) finds that corruption has negative impacts
on public debt. On the other hand, Egger and Winner (2005) find that
corruption stimulates foreign direct investments, especially in low income
countries. Similarly, Mironov (2005) distinguishes between ‘bad‘ and ‘resid-
ual’ corruption where the latter is found to have positive growth impacts
in countries with institutions of poor quality.
Yet, modeling corruption is not an easy task and many of the existing
research papers suffer severe limitations. For example, the relationship
between corruption and economic growth is likely to exhibit a bidirec-
tional type of causality and does not necessarily go only from corruption
to growth (Lucˇic´ et al., 2016). Moreover, nothing can guarantee that the
relationship between both variables behaves in a linear fashion (Me´ndez
and Sepu´lveda, 2006). Regardless of this, institutions especially political set-
tings in a given country can be a very important determinant of corruption
and the rate of growth. Such relationships are already well documented in
the literature. For example, Me´ndez and Sepu´lveda (2006) and Rock (2009)
find that corruption levels are peculiarly different between democratic and
non-democratic countries. Nevertheless, while the relationship between
corruption and a country’s political settings can also be bidirectional, most
of the existing studies tend to overlook such intuition.
Unlike existing literature which tends to focus on growth impacts of
either corruption or political settings separately, we show how the three
variables interact together simultaneously allowing for bidirectional causal-
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ity between each two variables. In other words, while existing literature
focuses mainly on how corruption and political instability affect economic
growth, in this study we ask a different set of questions: Does corruption
lead to political instability? Would political instability lead to higher levels
of corruption? Does growth lead to political stability and lower levels of
corruption? What are the effects of the Arab Spring on levels of corruption,
political stability and economic growth in the MENA region? For the latter
question, the Arab Spring offers a unique opportunity to quantify this
relationship in a quasi-natural experiment environment. In fact, to the best
of our knowledge, this is the first paper to exploit the incidence of the Arab
Spring to measure the effects of political instability on economic growth
and the level of corruption.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
the existing literature on defining and measuring corruption as well as
on the relationship between corruption, political stability and economic
growth. Section 3 presents the dataset and summarizes the empirical
methodology. Our empirical results are summarized in section 4. Finally,
section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Corruption is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that exhibits dif-
ferent forms and shapes. It is a very difficult term to define, and there is
no general consensus on a single, comprehensive, universally accepted
definition of what corruption could be. What is considered to be corrupt be-
haviour in a given society might not be seen in the same way in another and
therefore various interpretations of corruption exist (Iyer and Samociuk,
2016). For example, the most obvious act of corruption is bribery which is
strictly prohibited and illegal in some countries while it might be still illegal
but socially acceptable in other countries. In fact, bribery in some societies
turns to be a way of life as, due to very poor economic performance and
institutions, it becomes the only way to access public services. Even in most
societies where bribery is condemned and unacceptable, it is meant to be
invisible and its victims are not easily identifiable. This adds an extra layer
of complexity to any attempt in defining and measuring corruption.
Nevertheless, there are many attempts to put an acceptable definition
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to the term ‘corruption’. A commonly used definition is one that focuses
on the action of abusing public power, roles or resources for the purpose of
making personal gains. This definition is adopted in many studies includ-
ing the widely cited papers by Bardhan (1997) and Tanzi (1998). Therefore,
we adopt a similar definition as discussed in section 3.
In addition to the difficultly in defining and measuring corruption as
discussed above, numerous studies attempt to identify the main causes and
effects of corruption. A large list of antecedents of corruption includes polit-
ical settings, governance systems, economic performance and institutional
quality. Inefficient and complex regulation systems, for instance, lead to
higher chances of corrupt behavior by officials (see, Tanzi (1998); Wei and
Kaufmann (1999); and Goel and Nelson (2010), among others). Moreover,
only a few attempts have been made in the literature to investigate the
causal links, if any, between economic growth and the spread of corruption.
Ali and Isse (2002), for example, report no statistically significant causality
from growth to corruption. Another study by Aidt et al. (2008) finds that
higher growth rates reduce the incidence of corruption but only in the
presence of ‘strong’ institutions. Similar results are reported in Bai et al.
(2013) where growth is found to reduce corruption if ‘strong’ land rights
exist.
With the exception of a few studies, most of the literature on the growth-
corruption nexus focuses on causality from corruption to economic growth
(not the other way around). And the majority of this work confirms the
distortionary growth impacts of corruption. For example, Pellegrini and
Gerlagh (2004) find that corruption slows down economic growth mainly
through its detrimental impacts on investment and trade. Similar findings
are reported in Mo (2001); Anoruo and Braha (2005); Hodge et al. (2011);
Egunjobi (2013); Anh et al. (2016) and d’Agostino et al. (2016).
On the other hand, political (in)stability and the quality of institutions
matter for corruption. An early attempt to investigate how political settings
could be an important determinant of corruption is Lederman et al. (2005)
where they find political stability to be associated with lower levels of
corruption. Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015) establish causal evidence of a
positive nexus between political stability and corruption control. Moreover,
the findings in Campante et al. (2009) support evidence of a U-shaped rela-
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tionship between political instability and economic growth after controlling
for the level of democracy.
Furthermore, there is also a group of studies that combine the three
variables together (i.e., corruption, political stability and growth). Adefeso
(2018) find no statistical significant relationship between political instability
and economic development in African countries. Nurudeen et al. (2015)
find a unidirectional causality from political instability to economic growth
in the short-term while in the long-term causality runs from growth and
political stability to corruption. Shabbir et al. (2016) find that corruption
determines both economic growth and institutional quality.
Our contribution to this large and extensive body of literature is as
follows. Unlike existing literature which tends to focus on growth impacts
of either corruption or political settings separately, we show how the three
variables interact together simultaneously allowing for bidirectional causal-
ity between each two variables.In addition, we exploit the Arab Spring
incidence, and its associated political instability in the MENA region, to
quantify this relationship in a quasi-natural experiment environment. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to employ the incidence of
the Arab Spring to measure the effects of political instability on economic
growth and the level of corruption.
3 Data and Methods
3.1 The dataset
As highlighted earlier (in sections 1 and 2), a major challenge facing re-
search on corruption is how to define, and consequently measure, the term
‘corruption’. It is no doubt a difficult task to measure what is illegal and
meant to remain unseen. However, any empirical study has to be clear
about what is being captured and measured, and research on corruption
is no exception. As mentioned in section 2, this study adopts a broad and
commonly used definition which identifies corrupt behaviour based on
the incidence of abusing public resources to achieve private benefits for
officials. However, such a definition of corruption also sheds light on the
important role that institutions play in determining or combating corrup-
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tion. Good and strong institutions would impose appropriate checks and
balances, which would in turn spur growth and limit corrupt behaviour.
This confirms our intuition about the importance of studying the three
variables together and for allowing for bidirectional causality between each
pair of variables in our dataset.
To address our research questions empirically, we collect a large dataset
of annual data which covers 140 countries during the period of 1990-2017.
The main variables in our dataset include measures for corruption, institu-
tional quality, and economic growth.
Following our definition of corruption, discussed earlier, we choose
to employ a measure that captures perceptions of the corruption taking
place by public officials. Therefore, we use the ‘pubcorr’ index of the V-Dem
database. The index, namely public sector corruption, builds on the view
of a large number of experts to measure the perception of public officials
corrupt behaviour in a given country at a certain point in time1. The pubcorr
index takes values from zero to one, where a larger value denotes a higher
level of corruption.
To proxy for a country’s political settings we use the ‘poltiy’ index from
the Polity IV database Marshall et al. (2014). The ‘poltiy’ index is available
for a large number of countries over a long period of time, which perhaps
explains why it has been widely used in the literature. This index is based
on sub-scores for constraints on the chief executive, the competitiveness of
political participation, and the openness and competitiveness of executive
recruitment. The ‘poltiy’ score ranges from -10 to +10. Higher values denote
more democratic institutions. The Polity Code book defines a polity within
the range [6,10] as a coherent democracy, one in the range [-10,-6] as a
coherent autocracy, and one in the range [-5,5] as an incoherent regime.
In our application, we rescale the ‘poltiy’ index to range from 0 to 10 with
larger values denoting a better quality institutional set-up.
Finally, we measure economic growth in a given country by its per
1Arguably, whatever definition one considers, focusing only upon one aspect of cor-
ruption (e.g. bribery) overlooks its breadth and complexity and therefore might limit our
understanding to such complex phenomenon. However, any empirical study has to be
specific on what is being measured. Our measure here reflects our definition of corruption.
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capita real income. Although it has been widely criticized for not being a
‘good’ measure of the standard of living, the GDP is the most widely used
measure to reflect economic growth. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics
for the three variables described above.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
pubcorr 4153 0.5049285 0.3028824 0.0043169 0.9794533
polity 4153 6.674929 3.266204 0 10
gdp 4153 8.268439 1.555429 4.751814 11.62597
3.2 Empirical Methodology
Since our dataset composes a panel data of 140 countries over the period of
1990-2017, we begin our estimation by following the conventional fixed ef-
fects (FE) and random effects (RE) estimations for static panel data models
as well as the popular generalized method of moments (GMM) of Arellano
and Bond (1991) for dynamic panel data models.
In addition to our baseline estimations (static and dynamic panels),
we employ a panel VAR modelling approach to examine how corruption,
growth and a country’s political settings interact allowing for bidirectional
causality between each pair of variables. In fact, a distinctive advantage of
the VAR alike models is that all variables are sought to be endogenous and
interdependent. Thus, we have a three-equation system and each equation
has one of our three variables as the dependent variable while the other two
variables appear on the right hand side (in lagged form) as the explanatory
variables. Our panel VAR model can be formally presented as follows.
Yit = A0i(t) +Ai(l)Yt−1 + it (1)
where Yit = (y′1t, y′2t, . . . , y′Nt)
′ is a G× 1 vector of endogenous variables,
i = 1, . . . , N & t = 1, . . . , T denoting country and time dimension
respectively, and uit = G × 1 is a vector of random disturbances where
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it ∼ iid(0,Σ). By estimating the above model and running relevant di-
agnostic tests, we shall then produce a set of impulse response functions
(IRFs) which explain how each variable responds to shocks to the other two
variables in the system.
Furthermore, we investigate how political instability affects both the
levels of corruption and economic growth in a quasi-natural experiment
environment. More specifically, the Arab Spring offers a unique oppor-
tunity which we exploit to quantify the effects of political shocks on the
three variables of interest. For this purpose, we employ the Differences-
in-Differences (DiD) estimation to compare MENA countries (treatment
group) with other countries (control group). A DiD regression based esti-
mator can be obtained by estimating the following equation.
yit = β0 + β1MENAi + β2shockt + β3MENAi.shockt + φXi + it (2)
Where yit is the outcome variable; MENAi is a dummy variable that
takes the value of one for the treatment group and zero otherwise; shockt
is a dummy that takes the value of one for year ≥ 2011 (post-treatment)
and zero for year < 2011 (pre-treatment). The DiD estimator is the OLS
estimator of β3, the coefficient of the interaction term between MENAi and
Shockt. Xit can be a series of control variables.
To account for possible bias in the DiD estimator due to dealing with a
large and quite heterogeneous group of countries, we apply the propensity
score matching (PSM) technique to estimate the average treatment effect
of the treated (ATT). The propensity score, in this context, can be defined
as the conditional probability of the incidence of a political shock given
pretreatment characteristics as follows
p(X) ≡ Pr(D = 1|X) = E(D|X) (3)
where D = {0, 1} is the indicator of exposure to a political shock and X
is the multidimensional vector of pretreatment country specific characteris-
tics.
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4 Empirical results
4.1 Baseline Estimation: FE, RE and GMM
Our first step in the estimation strategy is to apply the traditional panel data
estimation techniques before applying our three-equation system estimated
within a panel VAR framework. Since we acknowledge the fact that causal-
ity between each pair of variables in our model may be bidirectional, we
maintain the principle of the three-equation system throughout. However,
it is worth noting that on contrast to our panel VAR estimation, the results
reported in the current subsection are obtained for each equation separately.
Table 2 reports our fixed and random effects estimations for three sep-
arate equations of GDP, polity and corruption indices. More specifically,
while models (1), (3) and (5) employ fixed effects (FE) estimations, models
(2), (4), and (6) are random effects estimations. For the GDP equation, both
estimations FE and RE estimations, confirm that while political settings
have a positive growth impact, corruption levels have negative effects on
economic growth. Both effects are statistically significant at 1% level. The
second equation, of polity index as the dependent variable, shows that while
corruption contributes negatively to political settings, economic growth
would have a positive impact on political institutions. The third equation,
of the corruption index as the explained variable, shows that both better
political institutions and higher levels of economic growth would be useful
in combating corruption. These findings are in line with our priori on the re-
lationship between corruption, political institutions and economic growth.
However, since the above specifications (1-6) are estimated for each
equation separately, exogeneity is presumed and causality is expected to
run only in one direction and towards the dependent variable. Therefore,
the obtained estimations are likely to be biased if causality runs in both
directions or even if it is unidirectional but in the opposite direction. In
fact, empirical research discussed in section 2 shows that this is likely to be
the case. Perhaps, this is why many studies on corruption and institutional
quality which use panel data models tend to employ a dynamic specifica-
tion in which lagged values of the dependent variable appear among the
regressors. In such cases, there is an endogeneity bias because the country
fixed effect term is likely to be correlated with the lagged dependent vari-
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Table 2: Fixed and Random Effects Estimations
Dep. Var. GDP polity Corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE RE FE RE FE RE
polity 0.037*** 0.038*** -0.004*** -0.005***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Corruption -0.301*** -0.390*** -0.891*** -1.153***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.243) (0.233)
GDP 0.806*** 0.757*** -0.028*** -0.047***
(0.073) (0.065) (0.005) (0.004)
Cons. 8.170*** 8.199*** 0.511 1.034* 0.753*** 0.918***
(0.036) (0.096) (-0.626) (0.606) (0.039) (-0.039)
N 4153 4153 4153 4153 4153 4153
Table 3: Arellano and Bond (1991) Two-Way Two Step GMM Estimations
(7) (8) (9)
Dep. Var. GDP polity Corruption
L5.GDP 0.915*** 0.261*** -0.118***
(0.002) (0.018) (0.001)




Cons. 0.871*** 3.638*** 1.614***
(0.021) (0.213) (0.003)
Wald test 3402 3402 3402
Sargan OIR test 0.000 0.000 0.000
A-B AR1 FD test 0.000 0.000 0.000
A-B AR2 FD test 0.265 0.930 0.533
N 3402 3402 3402
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able. Therefore, these sort of dynamic models are usually estimated using
the generalized method of moments (GMM) of Arellano and Bond (1991).
Table 3 reports our GMM estimation for the three equations separately.
In this estimation, the fifth lag of the dependent variable appears as one
of the independent variables. Yet, even after addressing the endogeneity
issue, our previous findings remain the same. More specifically, our GMM
estimation shows that while good political institutions have positive im-
pacts on economic growth, higher corruption levels would be detrimental
to economic growth. Similarly, our previous results hold for both political
institutions and corruption.
4.2 Panel VAR Estimation: IRFs
To estimate our panel VAR model, Eq. 1, we follow the estimation routine
suggested in Abrigo et al. (2015), who build on the generalized method of
moments (GMM) framework. The authors apply forward orthogonal devi-
ation proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) to remedy for the weaknesses
of the first-difference transformation when estimating dynamic panel mod-
els. We use information criteria to select the optimal lag order (i.e., in
both panel VAR specification and moment condition). Based on the model
selection criteria, first-order panel VAR is the preferred model, since it has
the smallest value for the information criteria. Therefore, we fit a first-order
panel VAR model using the GMM estimator.
Since that panel VAR estimates are seldom interpreted independently,
we proceed to estimate the IRFs as we are interested in examining the
relationship between corruption, political settings and economic growth
within our system of equations. Although the simple IRFs have no causal
interpretation, a shock on one variable is likely to be accompanied by
shocks in other variables, as well, since the innovations it are correlated
contemporaneously. Fig. 1 presents the IRFs from our panel VAR model
for all variables in the system along with its confidence bands. The IRF
confidence intervals are estimated using Gaussian approximation based on
500 Monte Carlo draws from the estimated panel VAR model.
The IRFs shown in Fig. 1 correspond to our three-system equation of
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endogenous variables estimated using the GMM method. The first row
in Fig. 1 shows the responses from a one standard deviation (SD) shock
to the corruption index. The resulting IRFs show that increased levels of
corruption would have statistically significant negative impacts on both
GDP and the quality of institutions. The second row in Fig. 1, which shows
the IRFs from a 1SD shock to Polity index, provides evidence that stronger
institutions would increase GDP growth and decrease corruption levels.
Finally, the third row in the same graph presents the IRFs from a 1SD shock
to GDP growth rate. These IRFs show that higher economic growth rates
are accompanied by better quality institutions and lower levels of corrup-
tion.
Figure 1: Impulse response functions (IRFs) - Shock : Response
Corr : GDP Corr : polity Corr : Corr
polity : GDP polity : Corr polity : polity
GDP : polity GDP : Corr GDP : GDP
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4.3 Quasi-Natural Experiment
The second objective of this paper is to estimate the short-term effects
of the Arab Spring on our three variables (i.e., corruption, institutional
quality, growth) using the DiD framework (Eq. 2). Table 4 presents the
simple DiD estimation with no additional controls as well as the DiD es-
timation for each equation after controlling for the other two variables.
The MENA coefficient provides an estimate of the difference in mean for
the outcome variable between the treated group (MENA countries) and
the control group (non-MENA countries). The Arab Spring coefficient,
which corresponds to a dummy variable that is equal to one for year 2011
and onwards, presents the difference in mean for the outcome variable
between post-treatment and prior treatment. The DiD coefficient presents
our differences-in-differences estimation.
Table 4: Diff-in-Diff Estimations - No matching
GDP polity Corruption
Dep. Var. (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
MENA 0.336*** 1.035*** -3.963*** -3.503*** 0.143*** 0.0840***
(0.0794) (0.0605) (0.152) (0.135) (0.0153) (0.0115)
Arab Spring 0.351*** 0.278*** 0.469*** 0.309** -0.0141 0.0379***
(0.0597) (0.0422) (0.114) (0.0985) (0.0115) (0.00781)
DiD -0.114 -0.155 0.589 0.614* -0.00241 -0.00104







Cons. 8.138*** 9.372*** 7.155*** 6.626*** 0.482*** 1.596***
(0.0299) (0.0721) (0.0572) (0.364) (0.00576) (0.0169)
N 4153 4153 4153 4153 4153 4153
Our DiD estimation for the GDP equation (models 10 and 11 in Table 4)
shows that the growth rate of per capita GDP has fallen in MENA coun-
tries (treated group) in response to the political instability in the region.
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However, this drop in economic growth does not seem to be statistically
significant. Moving to the DiD estimation for the Polity index, it seems that
there has been some improvement in the index as a result of the demands
for political reforms in the region. Our estimation seems to be significant
(at ten percent level) only when we control for economic growth rate and
the level of corruption (model 13). Considering the third equation of cor-
ruption (models 14 & 15), the DiD estimation shows that there is a slight
drop in the level of corruption in MENA countries as a result of the Arab
Spring. However, the estimated coefficients are not statistically different
from zero. Other estimated coefficients (for polity, corruption and GDP) do
not deviate from our results reported earlier in this paper (FE, RE, GMM
and Panel VAR).
Given the heterogeneity existing among countries in both groups (con-
trol and treatment), the DiD estimations reported in Table 4 are likely to be
biased. To account for this bias, we employ the propensity score matching
(PSM), thereby maximizing the observable similarity between treatment
and control groups. As an alternative to linear regression, the PSM analysis
allows us to create the two groups that have similar characteristics so that
a comparison can be made within these matched groups. The implemen-
tation of the PSM methodology follows the two step procedure whereby
in the first step each country’s probability (propensity score) of receiving
a political shock is assessed conditional to a set of explanatory variables.
For each equation, while one of our three variables of interest appears in
the left hand side, we include the other two variables as controls within
the first stage of the model to ensure that the two groups are matched on
similar characteristics (i.e., the level of corruption, institutional quality and
economic development process). Consequently, the treatment and control
group countries are matched on the basis of their propensity scores. We
present the results in Table 5 based on the kernel matching method. The
procedure involves taking each treated country (MENA) and identifying
non-treated countries (non-MENA countries) with the most similar propen-
sity scores.
As the linear regression estimates in Table 4, the matching results in
Table 5 suggest that due to the political shock represented by the sequence
of events known as the Arab Spring, the the rate of growth in MENA
countries has fallen by 0.33% (mode 16), the Polity index, which represents
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Table 5: Matching based Diff-in-Diff Estimations
(16) (17) (18)
Dep.Var. GDP polity Corr
MENA 1.214*** -3.275*** 0.072***
(0.073) (0.166) (0.015)
Arab Spring 0.547*** 0.097 0.011
(0.069) (0.196) (0.019)
DiD -0.330** 0.922*** -0.067**
(0.145) (0.353) (0.032)
Cons. 7.279*** 6.505*** 0.610***
(0.035) (0.097) (0.008)
N 3351 4000 3959
institutional quality, has increased by 0.922% (model 17), and the level of
corruption has dropped slightly by 0.067% (model 18).
5 Conclusion
This paper provides new cross-country evidence on the relationship be-
tween corruption, political settings, and economic growth. Unlike the
majority of the existing literature, we study how the three variables in-
teract simultaneously as well as separately. For this purpose, we use a
large panel dataset for 140 countries over the period of 1990-2017 and
follow the existing literature by applying the conventional fixed effects
(FE) and random effects (RE) estimations for static panel models as well
as the popular general method of moments (GMM) for dynamic panel
models. However, our main contribution to this large and extensive body
of literature is twofold. First, we show how corruption, political settings
and economic growth interact together simultaneously allowing for bidirec-
tional causality between each two variables. For this purpose, we estimate
a panel VAR model and produce a set of impulse response functions (IRFs).
Second, we exploit the incidence of the Arab Spring as an exogenous shock
which is associated with political instability, to build up a quasi natural
experiment environment with the purpose of measuring the short-term
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effects of political shocks on our three variables of interest.
Our findings provide evidence of a bidirectional causality between each
pair of our three variables of interest (i.e., corruption, political settings,
and economic growth). We show that higher levels of corruption will lead
to poor rates of economic growth and weak institutions. Moreover, good
and strong institutions would boost growth and limit the spread of cor-
rupt behaviour among officials. Our results also show that higher rates of
economic growth support institutional quality and help in combating cor-
ruption. Finally, our empirical findings suggest that while times of political
instability are bad for economic growth, they might be taken as an oppor-
tunity to improve institutional quality and combat the spread of corruption.
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